Numerous archival documents show how the 1575-1577 payment stop on the contracts with Genoese bankers (asientos) induced a freeze of the domestic credit market through the bankers' intermediation for asientos and credit linkages. Commercial fairs stopped, banks failed and trade suffered while the King granted legal protection to the Genoese bankers. The evidence strikingly confirms that the strategy of Philip II was not directed against the bankers but against the cities that were represented in the Cortes. He forced them to increase their fiscal commitment that funded the domestic debt (juros) into which asientos could be converted. The payment stop lasted until the cities agreed to the doubling of their commitment.
INTRODUCTION
In September 1575, Philip II stopped all due payments on his contracts with Genoese bankers, the asientos. That action triggered a financial and commercial crisis that turned out to be the most severe of his reign: for more than two years, it induced a near paralysis of the private credit markets in Castile and the stop of the main commercial fairs in Medina del Campo. Contrary to the traditional view, Philip II did not take this action against the bankers but against the main cities of Castile that were represented in the Cortes.
Why should a stop of payments to the Genoese be caused by a conflict with the Cortes?
In the political and fiscal context of Castile under Philip II, the Cortes controlled the "ordinary revenues," which provided the stable basis for the funding of the long-term domestic public debt, the juros. We showed in previous studies that each of the three payments stops on asientos by Philip II (1557 -60, 1575 -7, 1596 occurred when the level of ordinary revenues had become insufficient for the funding of more juros 3 . In this paper, we focus on the main crisis of 1575-77 and we bring new evidence.
Our political economy interpretation of the crisis differs from the previous studies on the financial crises of Philip II. None of them refers to the evidence that we present here 4 . They all focus on the interactions between the Crown and the bankers and neglect two central points which are related. First, the cities imposed a de facto ceiling on the juros through their tax contributions and the increase of these contributions was politically costly for the Crown. Second, a large part of the asientos was financed by the Genoese bankers through financial intermediation between savers in Castile and loans to the Crown. This financial intermediation provided Philip II with a leverage against the cities which opposed higher taxes toward foreign military ventures. The payment stop to the bankers trickled down the pyramid of credit to their Castilian depositors. The severe impact on credit and trade led the cities to capitulate, eventually. After resisting for more than two years, the cities accepted and voted in the Cortes a doubling of their tax contributions upon which Philip II immediately removed the stop of payments to the bankers, on terms that had been agreed upon nine months before.
The crisis of 1575-77 throws light on the political situation of Castile. As in other parts of Europe at the time 5 , the regime was not autocratic in fiscal affairs and therefore it was not autocratic either in political matters that were internal to Castile 6 . The central government did not have an administration to collect revenues. That task was delegated to the cities, the tax farmers and the Casa de la Contratación in Seville that handled the revenues from the precious metals.
The Cortes represented the 18 main cities of Castile and their surrounding regions. They pledged by contract of about six years a fixed contribution (encabezamiento) to the Crown. The collection of these revenues was left to the management of the cities. Juros were serviced by earmarked revenues, as in most countries before 1800, including
England in the 18th century. The juros that were serviced by the contribution of a particular city had a first claim on that contribution. Hence, cities kept control of the revenues for the service of their juros (which could nevertheless be traded throughout the realm) and these juros were the safest of the government bonds, with the lowest interest rate. Other juros were written on the revenues from tax farms or from the silver tax but they were not of the same quality and commanded a higher rate because these revenues were under the control of the central government and were more erratic 7 .
For the Crown, the delegation of the tax collection to the cities saved on administration costs and yielded a lower cost of the juros that were issued on cities. However, the fixed contribution by the cities generated a de facto ceiling on the service these juros, and because the interest rate did not change much, on their stock. As the level of the debt 5 Dincecco (2009) . Grafe (2012) , Chapter one. 6 This central issue has been highlighted by Jago (1981 Jago ( , 1985 , and by the illuminating book of ForteaPérez (1990) . For anyone not familiar with the context, the short review of Fortea-Pérez in Jago (1991) is a must. These works imply that the fiscal policy of Philip II cannot be analyzed as that of a modern centralized state. 7 Ulloa (1977) . Álvarez Nogal and Chamley (2014) .
rose with the economy and military expenditures, the contractual obligations of the cities had to be raised, eventually. At such times, a crisis took place.
In the early seventies, the attempts of Philip II to increase other taxes, (e.g., on flour), failed because of the opposition of the cities. Since an increase of the encabezamiento was long overdue, the cities probably would have accepted a moderate increase. But
Philip II had decided on a course that would provide him with much more fiscal independence: in 1574, he declared a tripling of the encabezamiento. Cities and merchants resisted against the tax farmers who had to be sent to collect revenues that did not reach their target level. In any case, the new setting could not support a public debt under the same terms as with an agreement in the Cortes. When Philip II realized that this policy could yield a permanent solution, he turned to his financial weapon and stopped the payments on asientos, which led to the credit crisis. Eventually, the cities could not bear the economic cost and they demanded that the Crown should come to an agreement with the bankers: they accepted a doubling of their contribution.
In the next section, we explain that although Philip II may have pretended that he did not understand much in financial affairs, he actually had become well versed in the workings of the credit market when he was the regent of Castile in charge of sending funds to his father, Charles V. He was familiar with the role of the bankers in credit markets and with the financial function of the commercial fairs at Medina del Campo.
He knew how to use the credit markets as a weapon for his political goals: he had used it when he quarreled with the Pope in 1556.
In Section 3, we analyze the relation between the activities of the Genoese bankers, the credit markets and the commercial fairs of Castile. We emphasize that Castilian residents had a large stake in the asientos through the intermediation of Genoese bankers and the chains of credit. We then show that the commercial fairs of Medina del Campo coordinated both commercial and financial trade. They acted a contingent clock for many financial contracts (both private and public, including asientos). Letters of exchange were an essential vehicle for rolling over trade credit
8
. The commercial fairs 8 The rolling over of short-term bills would become the dominant form of the public debt in 17th century Netherlands, as shown by Gelderblom and Jonker (2011) and Gelderblom and Jonker (2011). needed the credit market and the credit market needed the commercial fairs. We provide and use a new documentation on the schedule of the fairs.
In Section 4, we analyze the policies of Philip II just before the Decreto of September 1575 and the reasons for the suspension of payments.
Section 5 shows how the Decreto initiated a process that led to the freeze of the credit market in Castile, the cancellation of the commercial fairs, and the reduction of economic activity. The most recent world-wide financial crisis has brought considerable information on linkages in the credit markets and on the interactions between these markets and the markets for goods. A similar revelation of information has been left by the 1575-7 crisis in the archives that provides abundant support for our political economy interpretation of the crisis. The petitions to the Crown reveal that Philip II, consistent with his policy, far from punishing the bankers as the cities demanded, provided them instead with a special protection against legal claims of their creditors while allowing them to pursue their debtors. from some of the consequences of the payment stop. In particular, as the crisis affected all credit, bankers could not collect some of their own loans to residents of Castile. We document that the Genoese bankers benefited from a preferential legal treatment by the government against their own creditors and in their collection of private debts.
Section 6 is devoted to the end of the crisis. Our new material comes from two archives:
Archivo General of Simancas, and Archivo Valencia de don Juan in Madrid 9 .
THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF PHILIP II WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
Philip II was called the "Prudent King" as he thought out the issues and kept the cards close to his chest. It was an important part of his strategy not to reveal all his thinking and to pretend not to understand finance
10
. However, before he became king he had spent much time in understanding the credit markets and their contribution to the finances of the Crown. He had been the regent of Spain since age 16, in 1543. One of 9 We have translated a number of documents in the paper. 10 Parker (2010), pp. 179-180.
his main tasks was the provision of funds for the war of his father, Charles V, to whom he wrote in 1553:
"the main foundation on which the war can be sustained is money and credit and without those, one cannot do anything."
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The young Prince of Castile endeavored to understand the fiscal and financial system and during the 1550s, he kept his father informed about his activities in that task and about the problems that he encountered. 
CREDIT MARKETS AND FINANCIAL POLICY: ASIENTOS AND FAIRS
Asientos were loan and transfer contracts signed between the Crown and a banker, or a relatively small group of bankers. Under Philip II, most of the bankers came from Genoa. They were well placed at the beginning of the "Spanish Road" to the Netherlands 20 but they were much more than "foreign bankers": they played the essential role as the period's "moneyed men", that is, the group that Dickson (1967) . Then as now, the main task of bankers was not to supply their own funds but to connect borrowers and suppliers of funds. A central step in our argument is that the asientos were, for a large part, financed by the financial intermediation of Genoese bankers inside of Castile.
In a credit contract, the lender provided funds ("dar a cambio") to the borrower who took the liability for future repayment ("tomar a cambio"). A standard form of credit was the letter of credit that transferred money from one place to another, at a different time. The promise to deliver cash at another place could be rolled over back to the initial place. Short-term credit ("traer a cambio") could be achieved by means of letters of exchange between different fairs or different places. The price differences performed like an interest that avoided usury laws. Hence, the circulation of credit that was the counterpart of trade in goods provided a natural setting for purely financial transactions.
Asientos and credit markets
We have examined all the asiento contracts for the years 1570-75, 22 which include most if not all the asientos that were affected by the suspension of payments of 1575. In these contracts, one encounters three types of clauses that attest to the interactions between asientos and credit markets. First, all the asientos in that period include a license that authorizes the banker to collect interests in the credit markets as required for the business of the asiento and for this business. The license exempts the banker and his counterparts from the laws of Castile that could constrain interest charges.
Second, many contracts mention explicitly that the funds for the loan are to be raised in the credit market, with the expression "a cambio" that used at the time. intended, at the time of the signing, to use the maximum maturity of seven years of the contract. The asiento specified that the banker could cash early ("anticipar y pagar adelantadamente") the libranzas that he received, by discounting them in the credit markets.
The three clauses that have been described provide ex ante evidence about the tight relations between asientos and credit markets. We will see more evidence, ex post, when creditors to the bankers complained after the suspension of payment.
Commercial fairs as a clock for financial contracts
Today, financial markets operate continuously and the overnight credit market is huge.
At the time of Philip II, markets were thin and slow. The rolling over of loans through letters of credit was paced by commercial fairs that were widely spaced in time. "and what will be paid in ferias should be calculated according to the actual date of payment, because Nicolao de Grimaldo and Lorenzo Spinola did not want to accept specified dates in the contracts as long delays could have occurred in these fairs" 38 Table 1 presents data on all the asientos that were signed in the years 1570-75. The total amounts for each year, converted in ducats and the number of asientos are in Column 2.
Column 3 reports the fraction of the amounts of disbursements to the Crown that were contingent on a fair in Castile. The next three columns present data on the distribution 32 Colmeiro (1863 (Reimpresión 1988 betweeen the fairs of Medina del Campo, Madrid and the rest of Castile. In the last column, which is the rest, most disbursements were in Flanders.
In addition to the business of the asientos, the fairs acted for the Crown as financial center for other fund raisings, for some sales of the juros, and for the trade of libranzas.
Hence, orderly fairs were essential for the management of the public debt and its timely payments. Also, the running of the fairs depended on the timely payments of the loans to the Crown. Table A1 , which presents the exact dates. Circles represent dates and numbers of fairs that were actually held (from 1 to the exceptional case of 6 when the King ordered all backlog to be settled in 1574). Squares represent fairs that were scheduled but did not take place around their scheduled time and were postponed to be held with a later fair.
39 Phillips and Phillips (1997) . 40 Lapeyre (2008 Lapeyre ( (reed. 1955 ), p. 438.
In order to take advantage of the complementarities in market thickness, when a fair was delayed too long, it would be merged with another fair 41 . Because of the contingent credit payments, it was important that all fairs should take place eventually. , and the cash payment of all debts without refinancing. The dates of the fairs are presented in Figure 1 and in Table A 
THE POLICY OF PHILIP II AND THE SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS ON ASIENTOS
The tax base for the service of the long-term debt, juros, was stationary in the early tax base. In 1574, with no progress in the negotiations, Philip II abandoned the debt redemption plan and declared a tripling of the encabezamiento that was at first accepted by the delegates in the Cortes, but then rejected by the cities. A moderate increase would have been sufficient to avoid a short-term crisis and the tripling of the encabezamiento was much more than was required to finance new juros for a while.
That tripling may have scared the cities and stiffened their will to resist. But Philip II was playing hard and his authority was on the line. His actions are consistent with a long-time removal of the fiscal constraint by the Cortes
48
.
The unilateral tripling of the encabezamiento invalidated the previous system of the decentralization of the debt service through the cities and started a showdown that would last for three years. Without the cities' collaboration, and without the competent administration for tax collection, the central government had to return to the pre-1536 system of tax farming, a move that was resisted by the cities and their merchants. This outcome was not a policy goal of the royal administration either. During the 1574 negotiation with the Cortes, a letter to Philip II from his secretary confirms that an agreement of an increase of the encabezamiento to 2 million would undoubtedly be preferable to a collection of 2.5 million through tax farming 49 .
The events of 1575 confirmed the fears of the ministers of the King. For example, in
Toledo during the summer of 1575, Torregrosa, the administrator who had been sent to implement the increase of the alcabalas reported that the city's traders were willing to do everything possible to prevent anyone from taking the charge of a farm 50 and threatened to stop trading in the city and to carry their merchandises to other places 51 . In Cadiz, the encabezamiento had been of 7,500 ducats until 1574. When the King requested, by letter on 15 March 1575, a tax of 10% at checkpoints until the new distribution of encabezamiento would be determined, the city answered that it could not 48 The scope of this paper is restricted to economics. However, a full account of the events will require a comprehensive integration of economics, political and historical events. See Footnote 6. 49 "Garnica [the director of the Budget] has expressed a well founded concern about the difficulties that the administration will face in collecting such a large amount, (...), and there is no doubt that 2 millions sure and secure would be better than 2.5 millions in this way. The Decreto against the asentistas was cheered by the cities and the Cortes, in a parallel with the first reactions at the onset of the last financial crisis in the US and elsewhere, when many called for the punishment of bankers. As mentioned in the introduction, previous studies of the 1575-77 crisis have taken the similar view of a conflict betweeen the Crown and the bankers. The evidence shows that Philip II was playing a different game, which, to be successful, had to be hidden. Taking advantage of the popular approval, his first action after the Decreto was to summon again the Cortes, in order to resume the negotiations about the tax increases.
The Crown stated after the Decreto that it would not default on the asientos but that it would require a revision of the payments with an interest rate of 1% per month on the balances due 58 . The Crown had actually a valid point. The state of the debts with the bankers was in great confusion because asientos could be collateralized by juros (juros de resguardo). These could be sold for cash by bankers and then replaced by other juros to be returned if the asiento was repaid in cash 59 . The bankers as "money men" were also active as financial agents of the Crown in the selling of the juros. Our preliminary research has shown that as a result of these multiple roles, the balances of the bankers with the Crown might have been very heterogeneous. Some bankers may even have been indebted to the Crown 60 . We will investigate this issue in further work. In any case, while debt contracts with bankruptcies are efficient in minimizing the cost of information from the borrower to the lender according to modern economic theory 61 , the information problem has been in reverse for Philip II. The Crown wanted to take advantage of an opportunity to reexamine the contracts and to verify its net debt with the bankers.
THE PAYMENT STOP AND THE CREDIT MARKETS
After the Crown freezed payments to the bankers, they could not pay their creditors, who could not pay their own creditors, and so on. Given the links between asientos and 58 Ruiz Martín (1968), p. 141. 59 Ibid., pp. 121-125. 60 Forty years later, the Maluenda brothers had also sold more juros than they had disbursed to the Crown during an intermediary phase of the contract (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley, 2015) . 61 Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Townsend (1979) . the private credit markets, the payment stop threw wrenches through the wheels of the credit markets and the shocks propagated through the network of credit linkages, as they did in the most recent financial crisis.
In normal times, when credit markets function smoothly, most credit linkages remain hidden. In a crisis, they emerge as rocks at low tide. The 2008 financial crisis has exposed the complexity and the critical impacts of these linkages. Likewise, the crisis that was triggered by the Decreto of 1575 generated numerous cases of distress which we have collected in the archives, on depositors, on banks and, most importantly, on the commercial fairs.
The impact on Castilian depositors
During the payment stop, the bankers' creditors attempted to recover their deposits and sent numerous petitions to the Council of Finance. The following letter from merchants of Burgos is representative.
"Andres de Larrea, Juan de Ybarra and Andrés de Ecija, residents of the city of Burgos, state that Nicolao de Grimaldo, prince of Salerno, Juan Fernández de Espinosa and Esteban Lomelin owe us more than 120,000 ducats cash that were signed in a contract in this fair for payment Sevilla, Burgos and in the libranzas of His Majesty following the ordinary service that we provided"
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The petition highlights the multiple layers of the intermediation process in the credit to the Crown, which in this case took the form of discounted libranzas. Since the amount of 120,000 ducats was large, these merchants had borrowed on the credit market:
"Our association, in order to discount the libranzas, had to borrow (tomar a cambio) from other people for payments in this Court, in Burgos and Sevilla and in Flanders, on our own credit"
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The freeze of the loans by Castilian residents to the bankers had catastrophic consequences for trade, as attested by the numerous petitions that can be found in the archives of Simancas. For example, "The suspension of payment that was ordered by your Majesty has in fact suspended all the trades and has affected all the credit market and the spirit of the trade people, not only in this place but also in others" A group of merchants in the region of Logroño (present-day northern Spain), emphasized that the payment stop affected not only the bankers of the King but also the small savers who had deposits with the bankers, and their commercial activities 65 :
"We add to this the calamity and great poverty that from us is translated to many people who have entrusted us with their savings, under the thought that their were very safe and only from this service we provided they could support their houses and families. In this way, many craftsmen, ordinary people, employees and daily workers who lived and supported themselves by the business activities that depended on credit are now homeless and vagabonds"
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The merchants explained that because of the suspension, none of them could pay their creditors and go on with their business. They requested the protection of the Crown emphasizing that without their contribution, the bankers could not have lent money to the King:
"We have no other funds to satisfy our creditors except those that are owed to us by those who are affected by the decree. In effect, our funds were converted in the service of Your Majesty and without these funds, this financial support of Your Majesty could not have been provided" 67
The impact on the commercial fairs
The freeze of the debt and its impact on trade prevented the holding of commercial fairs at Medina del Campo. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 Espejo and Paz (1908 ), pp. 269-272. Colmeiro (1863 (Reimpresión 1988 ), vol. II, pp. 836-838.
The impact on banks
In Segovia, one of the main cities in the northern meseta, banks and economy activity were deeply affected by the credit crisis. In October of 1575, forty men all in important positions ("todos gente principal") were incarcerated. 
The legal protection of the bankers by the Crown
In face of the petitions and the complaints by residents of the Realm, the Crown provided legal protection to the bankers instead. Until the settlement in the Medio General at the end of 1577, this protection against creditors prevented any ordinary court of justice to force them to pay or seize their property. This decision extended to all types of debt since no distinction could be made for the debts related to the Crown's credit. Furthermore, the bankers used the Decreto as a quasi-official excuse to avoid any obligation in the set of complex credit linkages. bankers and not their Castilians creditors. These examples are but a sample of many similar documents in the archives of Simancas.
THE RESUMPTION OF CREDIT AFTER THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CORTES
In the recent crisis, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the impact on credit was felt immediately and policy makers reacted swiftly. However, the response of economic activity and unemployment was delayed. In the 16th century, with the slow clock of the fairs and of the seasons, it took time for the cities to feel the full impact of the Decreto.
When the initial cheers were replaced by a flow of complaints and petitions, and despite adverse events (e.g., the sack of Antwerp by his unpaid army), Philip II stayed the course. The government of Genoa pleaded through its ambassador in Madrid and reminded Philip II of the harm that was caused on merchants and bankers in this Italian
Republic that played such a crucial role for the Crown take with them partners, large and small. As usual, a plea was made for the poor widows and "honest" maids who had entrusted their dowries to the asentistas and were at great risk. 95 The larger part of the debt was not in unpaid arrears, but in repayments that were contractually scheduled for the future. From an examination of all the asientos that were initiated between 1570 and 1575 (and some before 1570), it appears that the total amount of the payments scheduled after 1575 exceeded 12 million ducats. Given the average maturity of these remaining liabilities, an approximate estimate of the present value of the scheduled repayments is about 10 million ducats. Arrears would then represent about 5 million ducats. 96 The sack of Antwerp by the unpaid Spanish troops, on November 4, 1576, seems to be a non-event for the negotiations. "Make sure that among the negotiators they have no power, occasion, or license to err in matters that are so important and so few, namely these two matters, the signing of the Medio (agreement with the bankers) and the encabezamiento"
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Finally, the cities relented. On 29 October 1577, a new encabezamiento was voted in the Cortes. In previous adjustments, increases had been roughly proportional across cities.
But in 1577, the shares of some cities jumped up, Seville from 10.2 to 17.5 percent,
Toledo from 5.8 to 7.6 percent, while Granada's share dropped from 9.2 to 5 percent.
After the agreement on the encabezamiento, the voting on the servicio extraordinario was sped up and a final agreement was reached on November 16, 1577.
Once the stumbling block in the Cortes had been removed, the 100 Some debt reduction took place in the text of the agreement. The evaluation of the actual debt reduction requires another study that would need to address at least two major issues. First, some of the redeemable juros were refinanced at a lower interest rate. Given the fragmented nature of the capital market for the juros that were tied to cities, the reduction of the rate on a juro was done by augmenting the capital, for an unchanged coupon, with the option for the holder to cash the face value. The second
In the text of the Medio General, the King made it clear that in settling with the bankers, he was following the express wish of the cities:
"…and adding to all this the demand that was addressed with particular insistence about the same affairs by the delegates of the realm who are gathered in the Cortes that we are holding at the present time in Madrid" 101 A decree that was issued six months after the settlement repeats:
"Given the pressing demands on this same issue by the ambassadors that were sent to us by the republic of Genoa and by the delegates in the Cortes, we ordered to settle with these business people (personas de negocios) the Medio General on December 5 in the past year" where the government and the bankers resided. After the crisis, some of these activities did not return to Medina del Campo.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the credit crisis 1575-1577, which is based on new archival material, is revealing on the structure of the Castilian credit market and throws light on the actions issue is that the bankers who suffered a statutory loss on their asientos in the Medio General, received some compensations in the years after 1577, including clawback provisions in new asientos. Lapeyre (2008 Lapeyre ( (reed. 1955 ), pp. 447-48, Espejo and Paz (1908) , pp. 94, 296 y 309. 105 AGS, CCA, DIV, 48-6. 106 Lapeyre (2008 Lapeyre ( (reed. 1955 ). Already before 1575, some letters had been written on the feria of Alcalá de Henares, which was closer to the royal court or even at Madrid (which had no fair). Ruiz Martín (1987), pp. 281-282. of Philip II and on his political relationship with the cities of Castile. The cities' relative autonomy limited the state's power and enabled them to bargain with the King. In some way, the involvement of the cities in the collection of revenues and the service of the domestic debt benefited the Crown because it enhanced the credibility of the debt and lowered its cost. But their fixed contributions, negotiated and voted in the Cortes, imposed a de facto ceiling on domestic public debt and on the ability of the King to refinance the short-term debt into long-term debt. The payment stop of 1575 was protracted because Philip II decided to remove that ceiling through a very large increase of the taxes and the cities resisted until the economic burden became too high.
By issuing the Decreto, Philip II could channel some of the Realm's upset against the Genoese bankers, but he protected them in practical situations. The numerous petitions to the King, the protection of the Genoese bankers against Castilian creditors, the reports of Philip II on the credit market before he became king, letters during the crisis, all these show that the "Prudent king" was aware that a large part of asientos were financed by the bankers' intermediation of credit and savings in Castile, and that the payment stop would put an economic squeeze on the Cortes. In an early example of a struggle on the debt ceiling between an executive and a representative assembly, the temporary victory of Philip II was achieved at a high economic cost for the Realm.
As the ceiling on the service of the juros was lifted, all the asientos were refinanced into juros. This point is important and has been neglected in the literature. The settlements of each of the three financial crises under Philip II included a complete refinancing of the asientos into juros. The debt to the bankers was not reduced to an intermediate level. It was reduced to zero. That feature is not surprising once it is clear that first, temporary adverse shocks to the budget should be absorbed through unfunded debt, asientos, second, an accumulation of asientos which corresponds to a permanent shock, should be converted to funded debt, juros, third, the crises took place when the conversion process could not take place because of the effective ceiling on the further emission of juros.
The settlements enable the Crown to make these refinancings.
The routine refinancing of the unfunded debt into funded long-term term debt in 16th century Castile is remarkable. France and England struggled to refinance their unfunded debt after 1700 and the wars of Louis XIV, and they took the indirect route of a refinancing through charter corporations. In France, that led to a failure after the disaster of John Law. England took more than twenty years after the Glorious Revolution to significantly reduce its unfunded debt 107 . In a previous study 108 , we have analyzed an example of such a refinancing through an asiento in 1595, and we will address the issue in coming work.
107 See Figure 4 .9 in Brewer (1988) . The transition from unfunded to funded debt is discussed in Quinn (2008) . 108 Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley (2015) . Ulloa (1977, p. 776) . Abed (1986, pp. 91-92) . Hernández Esteve (2010, pp. 72, 116, 121) .
APPENDIX
Each fair can be traced by a number of documents. The merchants and the bankers wrote contracts contingent on fairs that were named by their dates. If a fair was delayed, it was merged with a later fair but it kept its name (its scheduled date). Hence, some asientos may have been signed at a date posterior to payment dates. For example, the fair of May 1570 was delayed but kept its name. On 4 January 1572, Agustín Gentil signed an asiento with the promise to deliver 160 000 ducats "in the May fairs of 1570 and 1571that are being held together now".
For May fair of Medina del Campo, the schedule for payments was between 15 July and 10 August. For the October fair, the payments were scheduled for December. The sources are not very accurate on the exact day of the beginning and the end of the fairs. We have put a unique month for the date of the fair, but a fair could be held over more than a month. We have references on the fair of May in 1560 but no information on the exact date of its holding. "Ayer estuve en casa del corregidor con los regidores y trajeron consigo algunos hombres de negocios conferimos el negocio y todos conceden que estaban muy relevados en los tratos y de tal manera que confiesan los tratantes que hera tan poco lo que pagaban de alcabala en el encabezamiento pasado que no lo cargaban en las mercadurías porque no era de consideración. Yo les repliqué que quanto menos pagaban abra lugar de más acrecentamiento, lo qual no se podrá hacer así en lo que está muy subido, con todo eso están muy firmes en su opinión de que si se creciese el alcabala ni aún a tres por ciento en las cosas de comercio que cesaría y como ven que con los arrendamientos tienen aparejo para con los arrendadores de hacer dellos lo que quieren y que con abstenerse de tratar por algunos días y que cuando se acerque el fin del año han de hacer con ellos todo lo que quisieren y por todos los medios que pudieren procurar de destruirles para que otros no se atrevan a arrendar están en esto tan en su negocio, y creyendo que siempre ha de ser por aquel camino y que no se a de hacer por otro" Document 6. AGS, CJH, 149. Carta de Pedro Luis de Torregrosa al rey, Toledo 4/08/1575.
"Asi mismo les dije que si juntado con los 65.000.000 mrs y con lo que digo en este capitulo que es de mucha consideración ay lo de la ratta de los meses de enero y febrero y 24 de marzo y que si V. md. me mandase cobrar a 10 por ciento como le pertenece que subiría de los 80.000.000 mrs en que V. md. se la ha mandado ofrecer y allende desto les dije todo lo que me pareció que convenia para dalles a entender quan bien les estaba encabezarse y dellos ni de todo lo que hasta oy he podido entender de los del regimiento y de todos los más inteligentes y de negocios no se saca otra cosa ni la dizen, sino que con cualquier cosa que se les lleve a los tratantes más de lo que antes solian pagar en el encabezamiento pasado ha de cesar todo el comercio y que si sacan de Toledo 80.000.000 mrs cada año que es imposible que ya que los aya para este año que los pueda aver para el que viene. Yo les he replicado a esto y dado razones tan concluyentes que me parece que se pudieran y devieran satisfacer, no lo hacen. En mi debe de estar la falta, aunque no en la voluntad" (…) "los hombres de negocios de esta ciudad no están nada bien con los arrendadores antes procuran hacerles todo el daño que pueden y amenazándoles que no han de tratar hasta el año que viene y que las mercaderías que tuvieren las han de llevar a vender a ferias y mercados francos y esta asimismo es una de las causas por donde les parece que podrán pasar sin encabezarse por algunos días y en prosecución desta su yntención uno de los mercaderes de aquí hizo pregonar ayer tres del presente cierto memorial que un arrendador de Alcalá de Henares le envió ofreciendo por el ciertas bajas en las alcabalas si llevasen allí sus mercaderías a vender, pareciome que en esta ocasión no sanaba bien que un mercader se atreviese sin licencia y autoridad de la justicia hacer pregonar en Toledo cosa como esta, bien creo que los unos y los otros y señaladamente el escribano que no supieron ni atendieron tanto a lo que hacían, yo les hice llevar a la cárcel y están en ella" Document 7. AGS, CJH, 2001-647. Memorial de Simón Lercaro al Consejo de Hacienda, 1575
XXX"y lo que montare principal e intereses a buena quenta ora sea más o menos, se me mande dar luego cedula para que los contadores mayores me los libren por mitad en el segundo y postrer tercios deste presente año en este nuevo crecimiento de alcabalas en los partidos que yo señalare, (…) con condición que si acaeciese que el crecimiento de las dichas alcabalas no pasase adelante que se me haya de librar y consignar en los primeros dinero que el Reyno diese a V. M. por donativo, o en otra qualquier manera en falta del dicho crecimiento" Document 8. AGS, CJH, 155. Memorial sin fecha, 1575.
"Andres de Larrea, Juan de Ybarra y Andrés de Ecija vecinos de la ciudad de Burgos dezimos que Nicolao de Grimaldo, príncipe de Salerno, Juan Fernández de Espinosa y Esteban Lomelin nos deven más de ciento y veinte mil ducados de dineros que en esta feria les dimos para que nos los pagasen en Sevilla y Burgos y de libranzas de V. Mgd. sobre el servicio ordinario que les socorrimos, las quales por V. Mgd. se han mandado suspender y aunque en esta corte hemos intentado de cobrar de los susodichos lo que ansi nos deven no lo hemos podido ni podemos hazer respeto de aver mandado V. Mgd. impedir por el presente el cobrar dellos por justicia y quando nosotros de compañía dimos a los sobre dichos el dicho dinero y les socorrimos las libranzas tuvimos necesidad de tomar alguna cantidad de dineros a cambio de otras personas para los pagar en esta Corte, Burgos y Sevilla y Flandes, lo qual tomamos por nuestros créditos los quales avemos perdido y ni por ellos podremos ya allar ningún dinero ni otra azienda con que poder pagar lo que asi debemos ni la tenemos más de lo que nos deven los dichos Nicolao de Grimaldo, Joan Fernández de Espinosa, Esteban Lomelin y no es justo ni V. Mgd. lo deve permitir que por una parte se nos aya ynpedido y cerrado el camino para cobrar de los susodichos lo que ansi nos deven y por otra dejarle abierto para que nuestros acreedores nos puedan molestar con execuciones y prisiones. A V. Mgd. Pedimos y suplicamos muy umildemente nos mande dar su real cédula para que las justicias desta Corte ni las de la ciudad de Burgos, ni otras partes no nos agan molestias con execuciones ni prisiones y esto asta que V. Mgd. Aya mandado tomar algún buen medio con los susodichos o por el tiempo que vuestra real voluntad sea y en esto reciviremos bien y merced." Document 9. AGS, CJH, 155.Memorial al Consejo de Hacienda presentado por varios hombres de negocios, sin fecha, aprox 1575"
La suspensión que V. M. ha sido servido mandar hacer de las consignaciones, ha en manera suspenso todos los negocios y alterado todos los créditos y animos de los negociantes, no solamente en los desta Corte más en los de las otras plazas, que si V. M. No proveyese de algún remedio en el entretanto que V. M. Manda declarar su Real Voluntad acerca de la paga de lo que havemos de haver y que con el puedan los que deven entretener sus acreedores, muchos hombres de negocios por temor de las molestias y execuciones que se les podrían hacer se ausentarían, lo qual seria de gran perjuicio para todos los tratantes y el trato del todo caería, y la contratación y comercio se perdería de que a las rentas reales resultaría gran daño, y si V. M. Manda poner remedio en ello y con la confianza que se tiene que la paga que V. M: mandara hacer, será tal que se podrá dar entera satisfación a nuestros acreedores, cesaran estos inconvenientes y cada uno yra procurando entretenerse sin venir en desorden y se conservara todo el trato en pie y el comercio bivo, y la experiencia ha mostrado quan conveniente y necesario sea semejante remedio, pues en las partes y plazas a donde suele haver muchos negocios sea visto que siempre que ha acaecido algún notable acidente entre los tratantes que los príncipes han mandado suspender los pagamentos por algún tiempo, y proveydo que los que devian no fuesen molestados conociendo ser necesario el hacerlo por el bien de la república y para la conservación del trato y el haver V. M. Mandado proveer esto en esta corte se conoce quan acertado ha sido y sea no solamente para los que deven más para los que han de haver, pues en un açidente tan grande hasta agora no se a desordenado persona alguna y porque en Sevilla, Burgos, Granada y Medina del Campo como plaças de más negocios que las otras destos Reynos, todos nosotros havemos ynviado débitos para entretener y sustentar la mucha ocupación de hacienda con que a V. M. Havemos servido, y los ombres de negocios que residen en las dichas plazas, han aceptado y obligadose a la paga de los dichos débitos que les havemos sacado a pagar, si los a quien deven, los pudiesen molestar sucederían muchos inconvenientes, suplicamos a V. M. Que sea servido para la conservación del trato y para hacernos merced a todos, mandar a las justicias de las dichas ciudades de Sevilla, Burgos y villa de Medina del Campo que por el tiempo que fuere la voluntad de V. M., no admitan ninguna execución ni molesten a ningún ombre de negocios por las deudas que deven procedientes de cambios ni se haga ningun protesto contra ellos ni contra nosotros, según que se suele hacer preferir a los súbditos y naturales destos reynos porque dizen que para esto tienen justos títulos. Demas de lo dicho pareze muy justo que si los decretados han de estar amparados como hasta aquí, hasta que el decreto se execute o V. Mgd aya puesto en ello, otro remedio que V. Mgd. debe mandar hacernos en esto yguales a ellos de manera que a los que somos acreedores de los decretados no nos fatiguen ni molesten los nuestros ni las justicias de V. Mgd constándoles que después de lo necesario para el moderado sustentamiento de nuestras casas y familias, no tenemos otras haziendas con que satisfazerles sino las que nos deven los decretados, pues en efecto están y se convertieron enteramente en servicio de V. Mgd., y sin ellas no cumplieran los socorros que hizieron a V. Mgd.
Por que si esto no se haze es cosa cierta que caeremos todos en lo que disponen las últimas prematicas hechas por V. Mgd con los mercaderes que están insolventes y no pagan lo que deben y quedaremos ynavilitados para proseguir y continuar la contratación aun que después viniésemos a cobrar lo que nos deven los decretados. Suplicamos humildemente a V. Mgd sea servido con su Christianísima clemencia y misericordia apiadarse de su pueblo y súbditos naturales, poniendo con brevedad algún remedio y fin a tantos daños y calamidades como todos padezemos y podrán subzeder a todo el universal comercio de estos Reynos y rentas reales de V. Mgd. y si para mayor satisfación de que sea verdad todo lo referido (y mucho mas que se podría decir) fuere V. "El contador Sebastián López de Horozco dize que de quatro meses antes de la suspensión tenia puestas en deposito en el Principe de Salerno seisçientas y setenta y dos mil mrs como parece por su cedula reconoçida los quales aunque él a cobrado y cobra de quien le debe mucha suma de mrs no se los a querido pagar ni parte alguna dellos diciendo no tener bienes de que podello hazer por tenerle V. Mgd. suspendidas sus libranzas, y abiendo venido a su noticia que don Rodrigo de Mendoza, caballero de Alcántara, le debía ochocientas y ochenta y quatro mil y setecientos y diez mrs, la mitad que le abía de pagar en fin del mes de abril pasado y la otra mitad en un año rogó al dicho Principe le cediese la deuda o parte alguna della o de lo que abia de aber de presente o de los por venir la parte que el quisiese para socorrer sus necesidades que el dicho don Rodrigo tuviera por bien de pagárselos a el, lo qual nunca quiso ni quiere hazer sino cobrallos él a cuya causa se las hizo embargar en el dicho don Rodrigo y el dicho Principe visto esto a dado lugar a que ayan hecho otro embargo, a V. Mgd. pido y suplico que pues por lo susodicho consta la malicia del dicho Principe y que el no pagalle lo que ansi le debe no es por falta de bienes sino por no querer se a servido de mandarle hazer pagado de lo que el dicho don Rodrigo le debe o que le pueda ejecutar y no permita que no abiendo hecho cosa indebida le detengan sin hazienda y hagan padecer necesidad y que pues ellos cobra de los que les deben no dexen de pagar a los naturales destos reynos a quien deben" Document 15. AGS, CCGG, 309. Medio General, 5/12/1577
Fols. 3-4:
"Y juntándose a todo esto la suplicación que nos an hecho con particular ystancia sobre este mismo negocio los procuradores de estos reynos que están juntos en las Cortes que al presente celebramos en la villa de Madrid
El rey explica que los intereses que se pagaban a los banqueros, son en gran parte para pagar a quienes les prestaban el dinero a ellos.
Fol. 3
"deviesemos a los dichos ombres de negocios acabadas sus quentas de todo lo qual ellos se agraviaron diciendo haver padecido, pagado y gastado de los dineros que nos habían proveydo grandes intereses a otras personas asi en las ferias y plaços destos reynos como en las de fuera de ellos en las quales les havia sido forçoso tomar a cambio y socorrerse por otras vías hordinarias y extraordinarias de muchas y gruesas cantidades de dinero para cumplir y pagar puntualmente los asientos que con ellos haviamos mandado tomar y que por ser cantidades con que asi nos habían socorrido tan gruesas y en tiempos estrechos hera muy notorio que no lo habían podido hazer con sus propias haciendas y que así habían usado para ello de sus créditos e yndustrias con lo qual nos habían servido como factores nuestros a cuya causa les havia quedado de los dichos negocios muy moderado aprovechamiento y aún en algunos no habían tenido ninguno por ser mayores los intereses que ellos habían padecido que los que no les davamos" El rey reconoce la importancia que tienen las ferias para el trabajo de los banqueros y para que la Corona pueda financiarse "los dichos ombres de negocios nos han suplicado con instancia que se hordenen las ferias destos reynos las quales queremos y avemos mandado que se agan de aquí adelante puntualmente a sus tiempos ordinarios sin que se alarguen dilaten ni prorroguen por ninguna causa siendo como esto es tan necesario al beneficio publico y para poder hacer con más crédito, reputación y comodidad las provisiones de dinero que fuere menester para el entretenimiento de nuestros exercitos y armadas y las otras expediciones que se ofrecieren y también para que los dichos ombres de negocios nos puedan mejor servir en esto y restaurar y establecer sus créditos" En el MG de 12/1577 el rey anula el decreto de 1575 para todos los que entran en el Medio.
Fol. 11 "y por la presente damos por ninguno y de ningún valor y efecto el decreto de primero de septiembre de mil y quinientos y setenta y cinco y cédulas de que de suso se haze mención y otras qualesquier que cerca dello se ayan despachado para que no se aya de usar cosa alguna en las personas que entran y entraren según dicho es en este dicho asiento ni en sus bienes" "Después que me enbiastes estas consultas de lo que ha parecido para el Medio general y en lo del encabezamiento he ydo mirando y pensando con mucho cuydado en lo uno y lo otro, assi por lo que ambas cosas importan en la substancia y lo que della depende como por lo que la brevedad espera todo menester, y teniendo yo por muy dependiente el un negocio del otro…" Document 18. AGS, CJH Libros, 42, f. 42v. Copia cédula, Madrid, 25/05/1578.
"Y mandamos hazer cierto decreto de la forma y orden como havian de ser pagos de nos de lo que les deviamos por los dichos asientos y cambios y después aviéndosenos hecho relación por los dichos hombres de negocios y por los diputados que para ello nombraron que si el dicho decreto se hubiese de ejecutar ellos quedarían perdidos y destruidos y sin ninguna hacienda para pagar sus acreedores y el trato y comercio destos reinos y los derechos reales que en ellos llevamos vendrían en mucha quiebra y disminución y suplicándosenos mandásemos tomar sobre ellos algún medio y concierto de manera que cesasen los dichos daños e inconvenientes y las dichas personas de negocios quedasen con alguna sustancia de hacienda, y hechose instancia sobre esto mismo por los embajadores de la república de Génova que para ellos nos embiaron, y por los procuradores de Cortes destos reynos que se hallaron en las que últimamente celebramos en la villa de Madrid, mandamos tomar con algunas de las dichas personas de negocios cierto asiento y medio general en cinco de diciembre del año pasado de 1577…". "y escrito hemos también a su merced la instancia que esta señoría hace por que tenga fin la que se huviere de declarar sobre el decreto y si así no se hiciere creen que presto havra muchos alzados y quebrados porque parece que no se prorrogaran más los pagamentos que de una feria a otra ha prorrogado esta señoría los meses pasados" Document 21. AGS, CJH, 151. Carta de Andrés de Cañas a Juan de Escobedo (secretario de Felipe II), 20/04/1576.
"Andrés de Cañas, vecino de Burgos suplico a V. Mg. Sea servido de aver piedad del daño tan notable que yo e los demás de aquella ciudad emos recibido con Nicolao de Grimaldo por no pagarnos lo que nos debe diciendo no poder a causa de la suspensión que V. Mg. Ha hecho de las libranzas que le tenía dadas. No solamente perdemos las haciendas que tenemos ocupadas en esto sino lo demás que nos quedaba por aber consumido muy gran parte en pagar lo que debíamos y si algo nos queda no podemos negociar con ello por tenerla ocupada en diversos reynos y diversas mercaderías y abiendonos faltado como nos falta ynstrumento principal de la contratación no podemos hacer negocio de nuevo y asi cesamos de contratar en nuestro hordinario trato que es en lanas y mercaderías con que ganamos de comer y ayudamos a la República y servimos a V. Mg. En sus rentas reales por servicio de dios se apiade V. Mg. De nuestro daño recibido con inocencia y llaneza de nuestro trato mandando seamos con brevedad pagados porque la dilación es nuestra total ruina y hasta ahora sea suplicado a V.Mg. de parte de prior y consules de Burgos por nuestro remedio viendo nuestros daños y trabajos y como cada día crecen y no lo podemos reparar nos hemos determinado de venir a hecharnos a los pies de V. Mg. Para que se apiade de nosotros y no permita vengamos a morir en las cárceles y aquella ciudad arruinarse y consumirse, pues sin trato y negociación no se puede sustentar por no llevar a otro fruto aquella tierra."
Respuesta del secretario o del rey: "que brevemente se proveerá"
